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The commercialization of university research
and the establishment of clusters of entrepre-
neurial ﬁrms are often considered the magic
seeds for driving economic growth in developed
and developing countries (Miner, De Vaughn,
Eesley, & Rura, 2000). 1 Korea is interesting,
because its economy grew rapidly, despite lim-
ited direct interaction between industry and
universities and little clustering in the vicinity
of universities. Though government research
centers did provide beneﬁts to industry, they
were not pivotal to the growth of the Korean
economy. There are no signiﬁcant technology-
driven clusters beyond what might be termed
‘‘the Seoul macrocluster’’ that is anchored by
chaebol-based research, but also includes a
concentration of smaller ﬁrms in the Kangnam
area, and one that may be forming around the
relocated government research centers in Dae-
jon. 2 For these reasons, the Korean experience
provides an alternative perspective for evaluat-991ing the orthodoxy touting universities and re-
search institutes (URIs) and industrial clusters
as the strategy for creating economic growth
in developing nations (Quandt, 1997; Schmitz
& Nadvi, 1999).
First and foremost, Korea is not a develop-
mental failure. The Korean economy is a char-
ter member of the ‘‘Asian Miracle’’ Club.
Korean ﬁrms such as Samsung, Hyundai, Pos-
co, and LG are globally competitive in indus-
trial ﬁelds including steel production, DRAM
semiconductors, ﬂat panel displays, and cell
phone design and production. Given this suc-
cess, the relative lack of signiﬁcance of URIs
and clusters of entrepreneurial ﬁrms in the na-
tional innovation system (NIS) is curious.
Through an examination of Korean develop-
ment, we raise questions about the prevailing
wisdom that clusters and a particular style of
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tant path to economic development.
Why is Korea’s record in terms of university
technology transfer and the creation of high-
tech startups so mixed? Not only has the contri-
bution of university research to industry been
limited, but Korea has not had any signiﬁcant
technology-based startup successes such as
Intel or Microsoft in the United States, Huawei
or Lenovo in China, or TSMC and Acer in
Taiwan (Sohn, 2004). The remarkable lack of
impact of university-based knowledge on Kor-
ean development and the reason that Korean
high-technology clusters remain weak are the
two separate, but interconnected, puzzles ex-
plored in this paper.
The ﬁrst section brieﬂy outlines the national
political economy within which URI–industry
collaborations are embedded. It is followed by
a brief discussion of the innovation system in
Korea. This sets the stage for a discussion of
the role of Korean university and research insti-
tutes (URIs) in the Korean innovation system.
Special consideration is given to the relocation
of the research institutes (RIs) to Daeduck. It
is within this context that the paper turns to a
discussion of Seoul, which is the center of the
Korean innovation system in terms of elite uni-
versities, corporate R&D facilities, and venture
capitalists, and yet has not generated a sustain-
able high-technology entrepreneurial cluster. In
this section, we also discuss the relative failure
of the Seoul local government in sparking such
development. In the concluding discussion, we
point out that despite the relative weakness of
Korean URI–industry relations and the inabil-
ity to develop clusters, Korea has successfully
industrialized and moved into high-technology
industries.2. THE GENERAL KOREAN ECONOMY
Despite many changes and frequent articles
heralding the collapse of the chaebol system,
the chaebols such as Samsung, Hyundai, and
LG still remain at the heart of the Korean
economy (Jwa, 2004; Sohn, 2002). Korean
entrepreneurship has been largely conﬁned to
retail and low-technology industrial activi-
ties—the only signiﬁcant exception is a cluster
(discussed later) that developed in the Kang-
nam area of Seoul at the height of the Internet
Bubble and continues to host the largest con-
centration of Korean IT ﬁrms (Park, 2005;
Park & Nahm, 1998). Despite the debatablesuccesses of Taejon and Kangnam, there are
reasons for the relative dearth of entrepreneur-
ship. The Korean political economy has posi-
tively discriminated against small and
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Until the
mid-1980s, the government actively encouraged
the growth of the chaebols, while starving the
SME sector of credit (Lim, 1998). Second, cul-
tural and job security concerns limit the ﬂow of
personnel from large chaebol ﬁrms to smaller
entrepreneurial ﬁrms. Third, the large chaebol
ﬁrms can and do hire some of the most talented
SME employees frustrating capability building.
This makes it exceedingly diﬃcult to assemble
and retain the management and technical teams
necessary to build an entrepreneurial startup
(Suh, 2000, p. 18).
Not only is the capable managerial and tech-
nical labor unavailable, but also early-stage
venture capital is scarce. As Kenney, Han,
and Tanaka (2004) showed, Korean venture
capitalists were risk averse and, more likely,
to fund existing ﬁrms, than they were to fund
high-technology spin-oﬀs from either industry
or university. Also, Korean banks are risk ad-
verse except when funding their chaebol cus-
tomers. For these reasons, entrepreneurs had
to bootstrap their ﬁrms and there were few
experienced professionals able to oﬀer them
counsel on how to build ﬁrms. The lack of cap-
ital, skilled personnel, and experienced profes-
sionals retarded the emergence of an
entrepreneurial high-technology sector.
The Korean economic structure was not or-
ganized to create and commercialize new tech-
nology through entrepreneurship. Until the
mid-1980s, the source of new technologies has
not been internal. Rather Korea imported tech-
nologies through licenses or embodied in indus-
trial equipment and then used them for mass
production. In the mid-1980s, Korean ﬁrms
shifted to a system in which, in addition to
importing technologies, they began improving
them through R&D (Kim, 1997). To accom-
plish this Korean ﬁrms allocated ever-larger re-
sources to internal R&D. Over the next two
decades, these investments were suﬃciently suc-
cessful to move some Korean ﬁrms to the glo-
bal R&D frontier in certain sectors. Though
initially certain government RIs did provide
commercially useful research, after the 1980s
the usefulness of their output was ultimately
overshadowed by the growing corporate R&D
investment (Park, 2000). In this maturation
process that moved selected Korean ﬁrms to
the global R&D frontier, the contributions by
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URIs were minimal.3. INNOVATION IN KOREA
The Korean innovation system can be sepa-
rated into two periods (Kim, 1997; Park,
2000). The initial period was government led
and the later period was private sector led. Dur-
ing the 1960s and 1970s, while the strategic fo-
cus was on creating heavy and chemical
industries, innovation was neglected. Nearly
all eﬀorts were directed at establishing a basic
industrial infrastructure built upon imported
technology. At this stage, the government RIs
played a role in assisting ﬁrms in acquiring,
importing, and absorbing the foreign technolo-
gies.
Beginning in the 1980s, the locus of R&D
performance and innovation shifted from the
government to private ﬁrms. Private ﬁrms had
grown signiﬁcantly and believed it necessary
to strengthen their own research capabilities
to respond to competition in international
markets. The organization of the Korean inno-
vation system changed signiﬁcantly as the chae-
bols rapidly increased their in-house R&D
investment. Initially, Korean ﬁrms invested in
consumer electronics R&D, but later concen-
trated upon the electronics components such
as DRAM semiconductors, ﬂat panel displays,
and cell phones. To provide an example of
the scale of the change, in 1980, 54 ﬁrms had
R&D centers, while in 1995, 2,226 ﬁrms had
an R&D facility (KITA, 1996). Though the
giant chaebol ﬁrms were the most aggressive
in establishing R&D centers, recent statistics
suggest that more than two-thirds of existing
ﬁrms’ R&D centers are operated by SMEs
(Kim, 1997). Another indicator is that Korean
R&D investment increased from 1.92% of
GDP in 1991 to 2.96% in 2001 (OECD,
2005). This was compounded by the fact that
Korean GDP grew rapidly during this period
(MOFE, 2003).
Technology acquisition was a core strategy
for Korean ﬁrms. Since the 1980s, Korean ﬁrms
were aggressive in obtaining technologies from
abroad and using them to improve their capa-
bilities. For example, from 1962 to 1982 there
were 2,281 technical and licensing agreements,
of which 533 were with the United States and
1,287 with Japan. In addition to signiﬁcant roy-
alty payments, Korean ﬁrms oﬀered other
incentives to foreign ﬁrms including fundingcommercialization, facilitating local market ac-
cess, and providing plants and equipment. They
often sent researchers to US ﬁrms to absorb ad-
vanced technology. In the 1990s, Korean cor-
porate R&D investments began to show
results. Though approved technology imports
increased to over 200 in 1990, they decreased
in the late 1990s, partially aﬀected by the Asian
Financial Crisis, but also by improved Korean
research capabilities. This investment resulted
in a rising tide of Korean patents ﬁled at the
US Patent and Trademark Oﬃce (USPTO,
2005). For example, in 1985, Korean inventors
were granted 41 patents at the USPTO by 2004,
this had increased to 4,428 or nearly two orders
of magnitudes. To provide an indication of how
important the large ﬁrms were in this increase,
in 2004 Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. received
1,604 patents in the United States, which
ranked it sixth globally (USPTO, 2005).
As a legacy of the days of massive technology
imports, even today in Korea, the term ‘‘tech-
nology transfer’’ does not refer to the ﬂow of
knowledge from the university to industry;
rather to the importation of technologies from
countries such as the United States and Japan.
These transfers allowed Korean ﬁrms to pro-
duce new products and gave them access to a
broader range of technologies than they could
have developed themselves. An important side
eﬀect of this technology acquisition strategy
and the subsequent evolution toward internal
research was the emergence of autarkic ten-
dency among Korean ﬁrms. This led to a lack
of interest in cultivating and improving tech-
nology transfer from the URIs.4. THE URIS IN THE KOREAN
ECONOMY
In the Korean economy, universities and RIs
have diﬀerent roles. The RIs were established to
undertake mission-oriented research for the
government and for the industry. In contrast,
the universities were expected to educate stu-
dents, and did not have a signiﬁcant research
mission. In theory this created a neat division
of labor mirroring Korea’s needs as perceived
at the diﬀerent times when these two institu-
tions were established.
(a) Universities
The Korean higher educational system is
less than 100 years old. The ﬁrst institution of
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College (which later became Yonsei University)
founded by the American Presbyterian minister
in 1917. 3 The ﬁrst university was Keijo (Japa-
nese) and Kyungsung (Korean) Imperial Uni-
versity (KIU) located in Seoul, which was
founded in 1924 mainly to educate Japanese
settlers. KIU absorbed a technical college that
had been in existence since 1916. At that time,
KIU only awarded bachelor degrees, and it
did not establish an engineering department un-
til 1941. The Japanese Imperial government
had little interest in providing higher education
to Koreans. At the end of the occupation, Kor-
ea had an extremely weak higher education sys-
tem.
The situation in 1945 was dire, because many
of the skilled technicians and managers were
Japanese who were repatriated. At that time,
Korea did not have suﬃcient trained man-
power to maintain the existing industrial facili-
ties. There were only 11 Korean doctoral
degree holders and approximately 200–300 sci-
ence graduates (The Korean Federation of Sci-
ence & Technology Societies, 1980). Korea had
to build its technical manpower from this extre-
mely small base.
After liberation, the new Korean government
continued the Japanese administrative system
based on a strong central government and
placed the entire educational system, including
universities under the jurisdiction of the Minis-
try of Education. Since the new Korean govern-
ment was heavily inﬂuenced by the United
States, the Ministry of Education launched a
reorganization of the higher educational system
to closely resemble the US system in form. In
substance, the organization, rules, and ethics
more closely resembled Japan.
The immediate mission was to increase the
number of science and technology graduates.
This was accomplished by increasing the num-
ber of universities and expanding enrollment
in the disciplines of science and engineering.
From 1945 to 1947, 6 universities and 11 (voca-
tional and medical) colleges including Seoul
National University were formed (or re-
formed). Despite the hiatus caused by the Kor-
ean War, by 1960 there were 85 universities.
This rapid expansion resulted in a lack of qual-
iﬁed teaching staﬀ and a continual shortage of
ﬁnancial resources leading to a serious degrada-
tion of quality. Indeed, science and engineering
education was conducted with virtually no lab-
oratory facilities. Still because of the intense de-
sire for education, Korean students had anexcellent grounding in the sciences and mathe-
matics.
Given the conditions and the government
goals, the universities were, by necessity, train-
ing institutions. Advanced research was not
possible or expected. Research and inventions
were neither a priority nor a goal. Put simply,
stemming from the societal need, the univer-
sity’s primary linkage to industry was as a sup-
plier of trained manpower and not technology
transfer. Gradually, a research mission was
grafted on; and communication through publi-
cation in academic journals became the tech-
nology transfer method of choice.
The institutional structure of the Korean
higher educational system constrains the
interaction patterns between university and
industry. Korean universities are centrally con-
trolled by the Ministry of Education. Universi-
ties, private and public, receive the bulk of their
ﬁnancial support from the central government.
The central government charters universities,
decides admissions criteria, and university size
through budget allocations. There is a high de-
gree of national uniformity in terms of rules,
pay schemes, promotion and recruitment, and
general working conditions, although, since
the mid-1990s, greater ﬂexibility has been intro-
duced. The centralized allocation system meant
there was substantial rigidity in research fund-
ing. Central control and the civil service-like
compensation scheme eﬀectively decoupled
professional compensation from research and
teaching performance.
These institutional constraints mean that
Korean universities respond only slowly to
changing conditions. There has been little com-
petition between professors or universities for
research support. The result is a rigid hierarchy
of universities providing little opportunity for a
university with an entrepreneurial or innovative
administration to establish new policies and
practices that over time could lead to a signiﬁ-
cant improvement in the university’s stand-
ing. Until recently, there has been minimal
inter-university movement of faculty because
universities have an inclination to hire their
own graduates or ﬁll vacancies through old-
boy networks. Further, the normal professorial
workload in terms of teaching and committee
work is so onerous that many professors have
little time or motivation for research—much
less commercializing their research.
Despite these obstacles over the last ﬁve dec-
ades the size and technical competence of
Korean science and technology faculties have
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1,230 professors of science and engineering.
Of these less than half held Ph.D.s, and of
these, half were educated overseas and the
other half were trained in Korea. In 2001, the
number of professors had increased to 6,268
and 14,092 in science and engineering, respec-
tively. In recent years, almost all university pro-
fessorial staﬀ have Ph.D.s, and many of these
are from US research universities. As Korean
students went abroad for postgraduate educa-
tion, they internalized the research orientation
they experienced at the foreign universities.
When they returned, they imported the belief
that university professors should also do re-
search. Reﬂecting the improving faculty quality
and desire to publish, the number of publica-
tions in SCI journals increased from 300 in
1981 to 19,279 in 2004 (MOST, 2005).
Korean universities today have highly quali-
ﬁed faculty trained in global-standard research.
In terms of publications there has been very
substantial improvement. The teaching mis-
sion, however, continues to deﬁne the univer-
sity system in the overall innovation system.
This deﬁnition is increasingly out-of-step with
the rest of the world, where there is a growing
emphasis on university research as a lever for
economic development. There are obstacles.
In countries such as the United States, United
Kingdom, and China, where universities have
enjoyed an active involvement in economic
development, the universities have had substan-
tial or total autonomy from central government
control. Organizationally, the relationship of
the Korean universities to the Ministry of Edu-
cation is predicated upon a centrally planned
approach that may not encourage entrepre-
neurial behavior either in terms of securing re-
search dollars or in commercializing research.
(b) Korean universities and industry
The growth of any economic activity is fur-
thered by creating proper incentives. In general,
in university–industry relations it is possible to
encourage institutional interaction through
administrative structures or through individual
professorial linkages. Traditionally, neither the
university nor the professors had incentives for
developing industrial linkages (Lee, 2002). It is
only recently that there have been incentives for
collaboration at an institutional level through
technology licensing. The other new incentive
is that assistance to industry has been added
as a criterion of professorial evaluation.The most common role of university
researchers has been as consultants rather than
as either funded researchers or even co-investi-
gators. Industry’s expectation of the university
was an ample supply of well-educated gradu-
ates, not the production of commercializable
knowledge. Since ﬁrms developed their own
technology or imported technologies from ad-
vanced countries, they did not expect economi-
cally valuable scientiﬁc knowledge from the
university. There was good reason for this.
Most of the patents registered from 1990 to
2001 in Korea came from private ﬁrms
(78.8%), while universities produced only 0.5%
and individuals accounted for another 17% of
the total patent registrations during the period
(Korean Intellectual Property Oﬃce, 2003).
Further, there was very little inter-institutional
funding, that is, from industry to university,
and research institute to university. Research
was performed in institutional silos (Suh,
2000, p. 18) that were buttressed by major cul-
tural and social diﬀerences. Corporate research-
ers believed, perhaps rightly, that most
university faculty were more interested in pub-
lishing their research than doing work applica-
ble to industry needs (Lee, 2002). 4
Some have attributed the lack of interaction
to a lack of trust (Kim, Seo, & Han, 2000).
Though trust may be lacking, probably more
signiﬁcant is a belief on the part of ﬁrms that
inventive activities should be performed
in-house, and that universities did not conduct
research that could lead to marketable inven-
tions. Firms also criticize the direction and
the pace of university R&D. Conversely, many
university researchers often believe that indus-
trial research is neither creative nor challenging
and thus not attractive. There is only a minimal
ﬂow of personnel between universities and
industries. Korean researchers are reluctant to
leave the university to commercialize an
invention. In general, it is accurate to say that
university researchers and corporate decision-
makers inhabit diﬀerent worlds.
Given this situation it is not surprising that
the R&D collaboration between the university
and the industry is limited. For example, one
survey with a sample of 372 ﬁrms reported that
about 53% of all responding ﬁrms have never
had a research collaboration with a university
(Park, Um, Lee, & Hwang, 2000). The most
common pattern or relationship is one in which
corporations contribute money to universities,
or enter into informal consulting arrangements
with a professor, neither of which typically
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2002). The rules and standards governing the
university and professors have not, until re-
cently, favored the entrepreneurial exploitation
of university-based research. In sum, interac-
tions between the industry and the university
have largely been informal and personal. In this
respect, the university–industry relationship in
Korea can be summarized in two general prin-
ciples: First, there were few formal research
contracts, but abundant informal linkages. Sec-
ond, there were few long-term relationships
(Lee, 2002).
Most university inventions were until re-
cently owned by the inventors. The exception
is if the invention was made with government
research funds. In these cases, the right to ﬁle
for a patent belongs to the government.
Whereas one might think that ownership of
the patent by individual professors would assist
in commercialization, the situation in Korea
makes this diﬃcult. Where an invention might
have commercial potential, professors usually
transferred it to ﬁrms that in return provided
them with some research funding (Lee, 2002).
Anecdotally, in 2005, three engineering profes-
sors, one each from SNU, Korea, and Yonsei,
told us that they were hesitant to ﬁle patents
on their inventions and preferred informal ave-
nues of technology transfer. The ﬁrms decide
whether or not to ﬁle for patents, and list the
university researcher as a co-inventor. Due to
this circuitous procedure, the inventors did
not receive a direct ﬁnancial return from their
inventions.
At the end of the 1980s, Korean policy-mak-
ers concluded that closer university–industry
relations were desirable. To encourage cooper-
ation, universities received government funds
to establish three types of R&D centers: Science
Research Centers, Engineering Research Cen-
ters, and Regional Research Centers. The cen-
ters were meant to encourage cooperative
research projects combining university, corpo-
rate, and RI staﬀ (see Table 1 for founding by
year). The monies were distributed by the Min-Table 1. The number of SRC, ER
Year 1990 1991 1994 1995 1996 199
SRC 6 8 – 3 – –
ERC 7 9 5 – – 7
RRC – – – 3 10 1
Source: MOST (2005).istry of Science and Technology (MOST), but
were managed by the university researchers.
The types of university–industry cooperation
to be supported by the centers included con-
tract R&D, technical training of technicians
dispatched from private ﬁrms, and technology
consulting for regional industries.
In the early 1990s, the new Young–Sam Kim
government initiated yet another reorganiza-
tion aimed at strengthening R&D, though there
was no speciﬁc policy aimed at changing the
university’s role. The 1997 Asian crisis led to
the reorganization of the Korean university re-
search system and a decision to encourage
entrepreneurship based on university research.
An important reform legislated in 1998 was
the ‘‘Special Entrepreneurship Act’’ that was
meant to foster high-technology entrepreneur-
ship through technology transfer from the uni-
versity to the industry. In 1998, legislation was
passed creating a new legal infrastructure to
facilitate the exploitation of the university’s
inventions and patents. The Ministry of Educa-
tion also liberalized the laws governing the
involvement of academic researchers in busi-
ness activities that did not interfere with their
normal duties. Universities were urged to create
technology transfer oﬃces (TTOs) to handle
patenting and manage technology transfer.
The TTOs were authorized to license university
inventions to the private sector. In response,
many universities established new incentive sys-
tems to encourage their faculty to ﬁle patents
through their TTOs. To capture these rights
from professors, Korean universities created
new regulations. In 1999, regulations were
passed allowing universities to establish wholly
owned companies to commercialize their inven-
tions and research, though to date few universi-
ties have utilized the self-commercialization
route.
In 2000, new incentives to encourage UIL
activities were introduced. These incentives ap-
pear to have increased the number of startups
by professors and researchers from 337 in
2000 to 1,078 at the end of 2004. The numberC, and RRC granted by year
7 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
3 3 10 3 4 2
– 7 12 4 6 2
13 10 – 9 8 5
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creased even more rapidly than the total num-
ber of Korean patent applications (see Table
2). Despite these changes, the number of pat-
ents ﬁled by universities continues to be rela-
tively small and constitutes less than 3% of all
patents ﬁled (see Table 2). Of the Korean URIs,
KAIST is the most proliﬁc patenter followed by
SNU (see Table 3).
In addition to the university reforms, Korean
industry also became more willing to cooperate
with universities for two reasons: First, their in-
house R&D operations could not alone handle
all the technological paths emerging from tech-
nological evolution. Second, the role of scien-
tiﬁc knowledge was becoming increasingly
important. Korean ﬁrms experienced intense
pressure to remain abreast of the new develop-
ments in science and technology, and they felt
that Korean universities could help them.
In another strategy for promoting university–
industry collaboration, the government created
six technology parks in 1997 (Ansan, Daegu,
Kyungsan, Incheon, Kwangju, and Chung-
nam). Interestingly, not one of these technology
parks was in Seoul despite the fact that it was
Korea’s technological center. The performance
of these technology parks has not been strong
in that they have induced only minimal technol-
ogy transfer between university and industry
(Lee, Kim, & Sohn, 2005). Although in the fu-
ture they might perform better, their current
achievements appear to have been limited toTable 2. Professorial
Year Professor patents
applications (A)
Portion
(B = A/C
1982 30 0.5
1985 147 1.3
1987 300 1.7
1988 391 1.9
1989 485 2
1990 600 2.3
1991 917 3.2
1992 965 3.1
1993 1,351 3.7
1994 1,753 3.8
1995 2,131 2.7
1996 2,252 2.4
1997 2,765 2.9
1998 3,443 4.5
1999 2,686 3.3
2000 2,810 2.7
Total 23,425 2.9
Source: The Korean Intellectual Property Oﬃce (2002).providing space for 2–3 year old startups look-
ing for new incubators.
(c) Government research institutes in Korea
During the 1960s, as part of an economic
development plan aimed at the systematic tran-
sition from an agricultural-based economy to
an industrialized economy, the government cre-
ated a number of RIs. RIs functioned as gate-
keepers for diﬀusing the government’s
technology plans to the industry. They pro-
vided information about technologies deemed
crucial to industry needs, implemented pilot
R&D programs, and transferred imported tech-
nologies to the private sector. On a parentheti-
cal note, the existence of the RIs meant to
transfer technology likely inﬂuenced by indus-
try’s low expectations for research results from
universities. They were not expected to inno-
vate. Reverse engineering complemented the
strategies of large Korean chaebol that were
enhancing their capabilities (Kim, 1997). From
their inception to the mid-1980s, the goal was
not invention, but technology absorption to
close the gap between leading foreign ﬁrms
and the chaebol. Given their prominence in
Korea’s plans for industrialization, they re-
ceived the preponderance of government
R&D investment.
The ﬁrst RI, the Korea Institute of Science
and Technology (KIST), was established in
1966 in Seoul and began operations in 1969.patent applications
)
Total patent
applications (C)
Total patents
registration
5,924 2,609
10,587 2,268
17,062 2,330
20,051 2,174
23,315 3,972
25,820 7,762
28,132 8,690
31,073 10,502
36,491 11,446
45,712 11,683
78,499 12,512
90,326 16,516
92,734 24,579
75,188 52,900
80,642 62,635
101,782 34,894
791,114 274,614
Table 3. Professorial patent application by university (2002)
University Region Number of patent applications
KAIST Daejon 1,751
Seoul National University Seoul 1,666
Pohang Engineering University Pohang 794
Hoseo Universitya Chungnam 761
Hanyang University Seoul 715
Yonsei University Seoul 694
Kyongbuk National University Daegu 618
Chungnam National University Daejon 577
Busan National University Busan 523
Inha University Incheon 479
Korea University Seoul 464
Seongkunkwan University Seoul 456
Chonbuk National University Chonju 423
Hankuk IT University Daejon 396
Yoengnam University Daegu 385
Kyungsang University Jinju 361
Chonnam National University Kwangju 357
Chungbuk National University Chongju 348
Kyonghee University Seoul 303
Bukyung National University Busan 297
Kwangju KAIST Kwangju 290
Aju University Suwon 265
Kangwon National University Chuchon 250
Total 13,173
Source: The Korean Intellectual Property Oﬃce (2002).
a In the case of Hoseo University, one person has over 500 patents.
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Science and Technology (MOST). The model
for KIST was the Battelle Memorial Institute,
a private self-supporting R&D institute, con-
ducting research funded by contracts from the
government and private ﬁrms. A critical diﬀer-
ence from Battelle is that KIST was not meant
to become self-supporting (Woo, 2002, p. 18).
During the 1970s, about 20 more RIs spon-
sored by various government ministries were
created as either KIST spin-oﬀs or through
the reorganization of various existing research
operations. The justiﬁcation for these minis-
try-supported R&D institutes was the creation
of national technological capability.
Interministerial political struggles also played
a role in motivating new RI creation (Lim,
1999). These various RIs were expected to pro-
vide justiﬁcation for their ministry’s policies.
They also provided administrative positions
for retiring bureaucrats. The result of the pleth-
ora of new RIs was wasted eﬀort and a lack of
concentration on critical technologies. They be-
came the center of government-sponsored
R&D, but bureaucratization, duplication, andsectionalism plagued them. In an eﬀort to over-
come these diﬃculties, they were repeatedly
reorganized and consolidated in the 1980s and
1990s (Lim, 1999). In 2002, 19 RIs still existed.
Despite their problems, during the early stage
of industrialization the RIs did strengthen the
ability of Korean ﬁrms to absorb imported
technologies. And yet, because of their inability
to produce signiﬁcant innovations, there are
mixed opinions regarding the RIs. For exam-
ple, Pack (2000) argues that the RI’s produced
few technological improvements, even while
Korean ﬁrms signiﬁcantly improved their abil-
ity to obtain knowledge from abroad. Even as
late as 2001, over 85% of the government’s total
R&D budget went to RIs, whereas universities
received only 11.3%. Initially, this was under-
standable because the universities had few qual-
iﬁed researchers. Later, it proved less justiﬁable
as 76.2% of Korea’s Ph.D. holders worked at
universities. This policy of allocating the pre-
ponderance of research funds to the RIs made
it diﬃcult for university professors to remain
research-oriented and meant that students re-
ceived little hands-on research experience.
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mous cost from Seoul to Daeduk in Chungnam
Province to establish Daeduk Science Town
(DST). KIST was the ﬁrst to move to Daeduk
from Seoul, and the others soon followed. By
concentrating scientists and engineers, DST
was expected to become the foundation for a
high-technology industrial cluster. There was
an assumption that research laboratories in
and of themselves would encourage the forma-
tion of an innovatory environment in the Dae-
duck region and attract ﬁrms to locate in the
vicinity to beneﬁt from the fruits of the RIs’ re-
search. Unfortunately, there was no plan to at-
tract ﬁrms to commercialize the research results
and few entrepreneurs emerged in the region.
In many respects, the creation of DST as a
‘‘technopolis’’ was simply an ad hoc solution
to three other pressing problems (e.g., Oh &
Kang, 1992). First, it was meant to reduce the
over-concentration of the population and indus-
trial activities in Seoul. Second, it was expected
to create new ﬁrst-class universities outside of
Seoul, thus providing more inter-regional bal-
ance. Third, the concentration of researchers
was expected to spark interactions that would
lead to synergies and commercialization.
The goal set by the government in forming
DST was to spawn ﬁrms and establish a dy-
namic cluster so as to attract more activity
and unleash the positive externalities of indus-
trial growth, thereby creating a vibrant Silicon
Valley-like technology region. But the vision
was not to be realized for the ﬁrst 25 years, as
DST faced signiﬁcant obstacles. First, there
was no entrepreneurial base, so that the local
entrepreneurship would require outside assis-
tance (Castells and Hall, 1994). For most of
Daeduck’s history, there were no local-based
venture capitalists and no ‘‘star’’ ﬁrms that
might serve as an example to others that were
formed. From the outset, DST was imposed
upon the region by the central government even
as local governments were excluded from the
planning process (Hong, 1997). In other words,
the RIs were parachuted into Daeduk having
no linkages to the surrounding environment.
In the last decade things may have begun to
change. In 1988 the ‘‘Special Entrepreneurship
Act’’ was promulgated to encourage new ﬁrm
formation. The Act appears to have had an ef-
fect on Daeduck RI personnel and by 2004
Daeduck had 424 startups; most of which were
spin-oﬀs from RIs nearby. Despite this increase
in startups, Daeduck still has not spawned a
strong entrepreneurial support network, 5 di-verse business services, and the ﬁnancial re-
sources to become a dynamic cluster. In 2005,
Daeduck received less than 5% of total invest-
ments in venture capital.
Thus, the RIs have not sparked the forma-
tion of a dynamic high-technology cluster in
Daeduck even though a signiﬁcant number of
researchers were relocated from Seoul. In retro-
spect, the decision to relocate the RIs only re-
cently appears to have had real beneﬁts. The
Daeduck environment was unprepared and
the relative lack of private sector participation
meant that this experiment had little opportu-
nity for early success. The result can probably
be summarized in this way, a group of capable
government researchers were relocated away
from the ﬁrms that would have been most likely
to beneﬁt from their activities and no self-sus-
taining entrepreneurial cluster was formed until
more than 20 years later.5. SEOUL, URIS, AND THE GROWTH OF
A TECHNOLOGY CLUSTER
When considering the role of Korean univer-
sities in urban development, Seoul is the obvi-
ous candidate for study. When the Korean
economy grew on the basis of export-oriented
light industries such as textiles and toys, labor
costs were low, and small manufacturers clus-
tered in metropolitan areas like Seoul from
where it was easy to ship goods for export. By
the 1990s, given the increasing land prices and
environmental pollution, the Seoul metropoli-
tan area was no longer conducive to manufac-
turing, and many of the factories relocated to
the two neighboring provinces.
In the 1980s, Korean industry recognized
that mass production of relatively low-quality
commodities would no longer ensure commer-
cial success. The industrial restructuring during
the 1980s emphasized technological upgrading,
production automation, and the development
of high-technology industries. The manufactur-
ing sectors also changed as the ICT sector be-
came Seoul’s leading industry. In the 1980s
and 1990s, the number of manufacturing ﬁrms
countrywide increased from 53,527 in 1981 to
68,395 in 1999, but Seoul’s share declined from
14.9% in 1981 to 9.9% in 1999. Manufacturing
employment also declined from 725,132 in 1981
to 573,189 in 1999, though total employment
continued to grow.
The science and engineering RIs could
not contribute to cluster formation in Seoul
Table 5. Regional distribution of high-tech ﬁrms in Korea
(2002)
# of High-tech
startups
Ratio (%)
Seoul 4,082 43.3
Busan, Ulsan 459 4.9
Daegu, Kyungbuk 547 5.8
Kwangju, Chonnam 209 2.2
Daejon, Chungnam 670 7.1
Kyunggi 2,289 24.3
Incheon 453 4.8
Kangwon 88 0.9
Chungbuk 225 2.4
Chonbuk 103 1.1
Kyungnam 284 3
Jeju 17 0.2
Total 9,246 100
Source: The Korean Small and Medium Business
Administration (2003).
1000 WORLD DEVELOPMENTbecause they had been relocated. In terms of
universities, Seoul was well endowed but they
had little interaction with industry. So despite
the fact that Seoul had by far the greatest pool
of promising university-based inventors and,
therefore, had far greater potential than any
other region, there has been minimal contribu-
tion from the URIs to the growth of local high-
technology industry.
The Seoul municipal government only re-
cently adopted policies to assist entrepreneur-
ship (see Table 6). The ﬁrst explicit policy was
the opening of an Exhibit Hall in 1993 for
industry fairs. In 1995, the municipal govern-
ment established its ﬁrst business incubator.
In the aftermath of the Asian ﬁnancial crisis,
the municipal government became more active
about encouraging the development and
upgrading of local clusters. This active promo-
tion was again strengthened during the Internet
Bubble period. But because the bubble col-
lapsed soon after, it is diﬃcult to evaluate
whether the promotion eﬀorts of Seoul author-
ities have borne any noticeable fruit.
Given Seoul’s centrality in the Korean econ-
omy and the enormous attraction it has for tal-
ented Koreans from around the nation, it is no
surprise that it has the most high-technology
startups, in general, and in the IT industry, in
particular. This is evidenced by the fact that
out of total 9,246 high-technology ﬁrms in
2002 in Korea, 6,824 ﬁrms were located in the
Capital Region (Seoul, Incheon, and Kyunggi
Province) and 4,082 ﬁrms (43%) were located
in Seoul (see Tables 4 and 5). 6 Even while
manufacturing has been relocated from Seoul
to other cities and even abroad, corporate
R&D continued to be concentrated in and
around Seoul. It was only during the Internet
Boom that a technology-based cluster appeared
in Korea. The largest concentration of these
startups was in a section of Seoul, Kangnam-
gu, which was popularly referred to as ‘‘Tehran
Valley’’ after Tehran Street, which runs
through the center of the area.
Beginning in 1997, various IT and Internet
ﬁrms and venture capitalists established their
oﬃces in Kangnam. In 2000, it was estimatedTable 4. Number of high-tech startups in Korea
Year 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
# 2,042 4,934 8,798 11,392 9,246 8,498
Source: The Korean Small and Medium Business
Administration (2004).that there were 2,133 Internet and IT startups
in the area (Kyong, 2002). MNC subsidiaries
such as Microsoft, Sun, Symantec, Yahoo,
and eBay also established their oﬃces there.
During this time period, of the $2 billion in ven-
ture capital invested in Korea, roughly half was
invested in Kangnam (Kenney et al., 2004).
Many of the major IT and venture capital-re-
lated industry associations such as the Korea
IT Industry Promotion Agency, Korea Associ-
ation of Information and Telecommunications,
Korea Software Industry Association, Korea
Venture Business Association, and the Korean
Intellectual Property Oﬃce were located there.
During those heady days, it had a ‘‘Silicon Val-
ley-like’’ environment of entrepreneurship,
rapid growth, and capital gains.
Unfortunately, the Internet Bubble col-
lapsed, even while real estate prices continued
to increase forcing many of the surviving start-
ups to relocate to lower cost locations. The
startup ﬁrms relocated to places with lower real
estate costs and were replaced by the headquar-
ters for large industrial ﬁrms, foreign insurance
and ﬁnancial companies, and various other
established organizations. By 2002, many of
the Internet startups had either failed or relo-
cated (Park, 2002). Korean venture capitalists
were also seriously aﬀected, particularly those
who invested heavily in Internet ﬁrms. Despite
these relocations, Kangnam still has one quar-
ter of all of Seoul’s telecommunications and
IT service ﬁrms (Park, 2005). Whether Tehran
Valley was a signiﬁcant regional innovation
Table 6. Functions and organizations for high-tech development in Seoul
Functions Organizations Founding year
General industry support Seoul Industry Promotion Foundation 1998
Seoul Industrial Support Center 2001
Support for a particular industry Seoul Animation Center 1999
Seoul Fashion Design Center 2000
Seoul Printing Industry Support Center 2001
Support for high-tech startups Seoul Venture Town 1999
Seoul Business Incubator 1995
Marketing support Exhibition and Shopping Mall (Jamsil) 1993
Financial support Seoul Credit Foundation 1999
Attraction of foreign investments Seoul Investment Trade Service Center 1999
Source: Seoul Metropolitan Government (2002).
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so many of the ﬁrms failed, and those that con-
tinue have not yet established themselves on the
global scene. In many ways, Tehran Valley
more closely resembled New York’s now de-
funct Silicon Alley with its emphasis on media
rather than on high technology.
There was a brief moment when Kangnam
experienced Silicon Valley-like growth and
dynamism, but most of the ﬁrms appear to
never have had sophisticated technology or
good business models. Also, many did not have
skilled management or ﬁrst-class technologists
from either industry or the URIs, local or
otherwise. Whether the surviving ﬁrms will
form the basis for another wave of innovation,
thereby creating an evolving, self-sustaining
cluster is not clear at the moment. What is clear
is that even today universities or other research
and educational institutions have not yet been
integrated into the Kangnam entrepreneurial
economy, such as it is.6. DECENTRALIZATION POLICY—THE
ANTI-CLUSTER POLICY
Beginning in the early 1980s, the decentral-
ization policy was expanded from Seoul itself
to its suburbs in the Capital Region to include
Seoul, Incheon City, and Kyunggi Province.
Given the drive to decentralize, although Seoul
had the greatest potential for experiencing uni-
versity–industry interaction and entrepreneur-
ial cluster formation, it has received the
lowest priority in national support programs.
Knowledge-based ﬁrms did spontaneouslygather in Seoul or the Capital Region, even as
the central government invested resources in
trying to establish technology clusters in the
non-Capital Region area. The decentralization
policy, though it may have been good for inter-
regional equity, ensured that Korea’s most sig-
niﬁcant eﬀorts to encourage entrepreneurship
and the development of innovative clusters
were concentrated in locations that had few
prerequisites for being successful.
The policy meant that second-tier universities
received the greatest assistance, while the uni-
versities that had the highest probability of gen-
erating and transferring valuable knowledge
were omitted from the regional innovation
policy. As with the RIs that moved to Daeduck,
these local universities had no entrepre-
neurial support infrastructure and little hope
of building one. For example, the venture
capital ﬁrms that provide equity ﬁnance for
high-tech startups were in Seoul as were other
professional service ﬁrms capable of providing
assistance.
Given the control exerted by the central gov-
ernment, local governments were largely pre-
cluded from developing their own initiatives. 7
Compared to other regions, Seoul’s local gov-
ernment had the greatest handicap because
the decentralization policy assigned it the low-
est priority. On its own initiative, the city gov-
ernment did establish programs aimed at
connecting researchers to the region’s small
and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). The
most notable city government action was a
1998 decision to fund two business incubators:
the Seoul Business Incubator and the Seoul
Venture Town. The incubators were meant to
1002 WORLD DEVELOPMENTprovide low rent space for high-technology
startups. Seoul Venture Town was located in
the center of Kangnam, and aimed to encour-
age high-tech ﬁrms in the Valley to secure ben-
eﬁts of clustering. The Seoul Business
Incubator also assisted entrepreneurs having
diﬃculties in commercializing technologies
and/or inventions.
Decentralization itself probably had only a
minimal depressing eﬀect on the development
of clusters. Perhaps, more important, it was
symptomatic of deep involvement by the central
government in microlevel management that dis-
couraged individual and institutional initiative.
Given the lack of encouragement, Seoul oﬃcials
acted only very late to try to encourage the
growth of a high-technology cluster. Kangnam
continues to have some entrepreneurial activity
in wireless applications, game software, and
various Internet-related ventures, though very
few of the ﬁrms have grown to a signiﬁcant size.7. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The Korean universities began as training
institutions rather than new knowledge genera-
tors. For this reason, universities have had little
signiﬁcant role in new knowledge generation
for commercialization. They were not research
institutions. Korea overcame a general lack of
technology by importing it and establishing
the RIs. The rapid growth of the Korean econ-
omy meant that by the 1980s Korean chaebol
had developed suﬃciently to manage technol-
ogy importation without government assis-
tance. In 2005, the absence of a strong
university-based research establishment means
that Korea is still almost entirely dependent
upon the innovations generated by industry,
particularly after the 1980s when the RIs be-
came less relevant.
Government policy regarding decentraliza-
tion may also be partially responsible for the
lack of any global-class, high-technology clus-
ters in Korea. The Korean decentralization
program was diﬀerent from that in most na-
tions where decentralization means the devolu-
tion of power to the regions, in Korea it simply
means the central government moved functions
out of Seoul—control remained centralized.
Programs to encourage entrepreneurship or
university–industry interaction targeted other
regions, all of which had little possibility of
developing signiﬁcant high-technology activity.
The prime example of the decentralization pol-icy was the transfer of the RIs to Daeduck—a
strategy that only recently may be having a dis-
cernable impact on the development of a high-
technology cluster there. This also relocated a
portion of Korea’s total research from
Seoul—the location of the strongest support
environment for entrepreneurship in Korea.
The decentralization plan was initiated for the
purpose of balancing regional power and
decreasing the over-concentration in Seoul, as
a side eﬀect it probably retarded the develop-
ment of high-technology industries in Seoul
and did not signiﬁcantly improve technology
development in the recipient cities.
Korean universities were and are still, to a
substantial degree, embedded in a hierarchical
and conservative system creating signiﬁcant
obstacles to inter-institutional knowledge
transfer and entrepreneurship. In the late
1990s, policy-makers and university adminis-
trators changed their outlook and recognized
the importance of encouraging entrepreneur-
ship and building viable clusters. Nonetheless,
bureaucratic, social, and cultural obstacles are
slowing the increase in entrepreneurship based
on university research. The near-term emer-
gence of vibrant clusters based on small high-
technology ﬁrms in Seoul or elsewhere in Korea
is unlikely.
The nature of the university’s embeddedness
in the Korean political economy also aﬀected
their ability to contribute to Seoul’s develop-
ment. Korean URIs did not reward researchers
for contributions to industry nor did they
encourage entrepreneurship (Lee, 2002). But
as we have seen since 2000, the new incentive
schemes for enhancing academic entrepreneur-
ship are changing. The social norms governing
university faculty might change and lead to
greater acceptance of academic involvement in
corporate research.
There is no one unambiguously superior
model for interaction between the university
and the industry. Despite having weak URI–
industry interaction and little entrepreneurial
clustering, Korean universities and Korean
society generally have experienced rapid expan-
sion. It is useful to appreciate the strengths of
the Korean system. First and foremost, the uni-
versities trained a large pool of talented scien-
tists and engineers that became the workers
upon which Korean ﬁrms have propelled them-
selves into the world’s ﬁrst rank and from
whose work Korean living standards have ad-
vanced to near developed country status. They
were an excellent base for Korean economic
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nels for inter-institutional information ﬂow.
Having said this, there is a growing belief
among policy-makers and university adminis-
trators of the importance of encouraging URI
entrepreneurship and entrepreneurial clusters.
Reshaping a socio-economic system is ofteneasier when it has failed—something that is
not the case in Korea. Today, in Korea there
is a general consensus that the country’s chal-
lenge is to initiate an evolutionary process that
will permit the current innovation system to re-
tain the desirable characteristics while building
new clusters and entrepreneurial capacity.NOTES1. This metaphor is borrowed from Miner et al. (2000)
who referred to the widely held belief that university
research was a magic seed from which Jack’s beanstalk
of economic development would grow.
2. There is a continuing controversy as to whether a
signiﬁcant cluster has emerged in Daeduk. Shin (2001)
and Sung, Gibson, and Kang (2003) make the strongest
argument that there is an entrepreneurial cluster.3. Chosun Christian College was founded by Presby-
terian minister H.G. Underwood without legal recogni-
tion in 1915, and changed its name to Yonhee Junior
College upon certiﬁcation in 1917 (Woo, 2002). It
became Yonsei University after merging with Severance
Medical College.4. There was also an undercurrent of distrust of the
chaebols by university faculty and students that can be
traced back to the years of dictatorship.
5. On entrepreneurial support networks, see Kenney
and Patton (2005).
6. In Korea a high-tech startup is deﬁned as a ﬁrm that
invests more than 5% of total sales into R&D, or if sales
due to a patent account for more than 50% of total sales,
or if venture capital investors control more than 10% of
stockholders’ equity.
7. Few local governments in Korea can actively inﬂu-
ence their own local economies. Only recently have local
governments received greater autonomy to adopt poli-
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